Chapter 23 Which Problems Are Actually Solved?
23.1 Chapter Overview
Consciousness research has made substantial scientific and philosophical progress over the past several decades. Researchers now possess far more sophisticated tools for studying:
- neural activity;
- conscious report;
- altered states;
- attention;
- perception;
- self-monitoring;
- and disorders of consciousness.
At the same time, many foundational questions remain deeply unresolved.
This chapter examines which problems of consciousness have been:
- substantially clarified;
- partially explained;
- or remain fundamentally open.
Importantly, theories should not necessarily be judged according to whether they solve every aspect of consciousness simultaneously. Different theories often target different explanatory problems.
Some theories explain:
- conscious access;
- reportability;
- attention;
- or neural dynamics.
Others focus on:
- phenomenology;
- selfhood;
- embodiment;
- or the metaphysical origin of experience itself.
This chapter therefore evaluates progress across multiple dimensions rather than asking whether consciousness has been “fully solved.”
23.2 Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, the reader should be able to:
- Distinguish solved, partially solved, and unresolved problems
- Explain why some problems are easier to study experimentally
- Analyze the distinction between easy and hard problems
- Compare empirical versus philosophical progress
- Explain why theories target different explanatory goals
- Evaluate current limitations in consciousness science
- Understand why partial explanations remain scientifically valuable
23.3 Core Idea in One Picture
Figure 23.1 summarizes the current state of progress across major problems of consciousness.
Figure 23.1: Progress across major problems of consciousness. Panel 1 distinguishes substantially clarified, partially explained, and unresolved problems. Panel 2 compares empirical and philosophical progress. Panel 3 illustrates easy versus hard problems. Panel 4 maps theories to their primary explanatory targets. Panel 5 compares neural, computational, phenomenological, and metaphysical levels of explanation. Panel 6 illustrates why partial explanations remain scientifically valuable.
As shown in Figure 23.1, consciousness research has achieved important progress in several empirical domains while many foundational philosophical questions remain unresolved.
23.4 Why Consciousness Problems Differ
Not all problems of consciousness are equally difficult.
Some questions involve:
- observable behaviour;
- neural activity;
- information processing;
- or measurable cognitive functions.
These are often more accessible experimentally.
Other questions concern:
- subjective feeling;
- phenomenology;
- qualitative character;
- and the metaphysical nature of experience.
These problems are considerably harder because subjective experience cannot be directly observed externally.
Figure 23.1 Panel 3 illustrates this distinction between relatively tractable “easy problems” and deeper unresolved problems.
23.5 Problems with Significant Progress
Several important areas of consciousness research have seen substantial scientific progress.
Figure 23.1 Panel 1 categorizes these advances.
23.5.1 Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Researchers have identified many neural correlates associated with conscious perception, including:
- thalamocortical dynamics;
- recurrent processing;
- large-scale integration;
- and frontoparietal activity.
Although correlation does not equal explanation, important regularities have been identified.
23.5.2 Wakefulness and Unconsciousness
There is now substantial understanding of differences between:
- wakefulness;
- sleep;
- anesthesia;
- coma;
- and certain disorders of consciousness.
Neural integration and large-scale coordination appear especially important.
23.5.3 Attention and Reportability
Research has clarified relationships among:
- attention;
- reportability;
- working memory;
- and conscious access.
Theories such as Global Workspace Theory have been especially influential in this domain.
23.5.4 Perceptual Masking
Experiments involving masking and binocular rivalry have helped identify conditions under which information becomes consciously accessible.
23.5.5 Anesthesia and Consciousness Suppression
Anesthesia research has significantly improved understanding of how:
- large-scale neural communication;
- recurrent processing;
- and global integration
change during loss of consciousness.
23.5.6 Disorders of Consciousness
Clinical neuroscience has made major progress in diagnosing:
- coma;
- vegetative state;
- minimally conscious state;
- and covert awareness.
Neuroimaging and EEG techniques have revealed cases of preserved awareness in behaviourally unresponsive patients.
23.5.7 Metacognition and Confidence
Research on metacognition has clarified mechanisms underlying:
- confidence estimation;
- self-monitoring;
- uncertainty tracking;
- and introspective reporting.
23.6 Problems Partially Explained
Many problems have received partial but incomplete explanations.
Figure 23.1 Panel 1 places these in an intermediate category.
23.6.1 Unity of Consciousness
Researchers partially understand how information becomes integrated into coherent experience.
However:
why experience appears unified rather than fragmented remains unresolved.
23.6.2 Self-Consciousness
Progress has been made concerning:
- self-modeling;
- bodily ownership;
- autobiographical memory;
- and metacognition.
Yet the nature of the subjective self remains controversial.
23.6.3 Bodily Ownership
Research involving:
- rubber-hand illusions;
- virtual embodiment;
- and multisensory integration
has clarified mechanisms underlying bodily ownership.
However, philosophical questions concerning embodiment and selfhood remain open.
23.6.4 Dream Consciousness
Researchers understand many neural features of dreaming, especially REM sleep.
Yet questions remain concerning:
- internally generated worlds;
- dream selfhood;
- and altered logic during dreams.
23.6.5 Emotional Consciousness
Neuroscience has clarified relationships among:
- affect;
- bodily regulation;
- and emotional processing.
However, the qualitative nature of emotional feeling remains difficult to explain.
23.6.6 Animal Consciousness
Comparative neuroscience increasingly suggests that many animals possess varying forms of conscious experience.
However:
- precise criteria;
- levels of consciousness;
- and phenomenological differences
remain uncertain.
23.6.7 Infant Consciousness
Research suggests that infants likely possess some form of conscious awareness earlier than once assumed.
Yet developmental transitions remain incompletely understood.
23.7 Problems Not Yet Solved
Several foundational problems remain deeply unresolved.
Figure 23.1 Panel 1 places these within the unresolved category.
23.8 The Hard Problem
The hard problem asks:
Why should physical or computational processes produce subjective experience at all?
No existing theory commands consensus on this issue.
23.9 The Explanatory Gap
Researchers still lack a clear explanation connecting:
- physical structure; and:
- qualitative subjective character.
Why neural activity should feel like anything remains mysterious.
23.10 Qualitative Character
The nature of:
- qualia;
- phenomenal properties;
- and subjective feeling
remains deeply contested.
23.10.1 Measurement Without Report
It remains difficult to determine consciousness objectively in systems unable to communicate directly, including:
- infants;
- non-human animals;
- severely impaired patients;
- and artificial systems.
23.10.2 Conscious vs Unconscious Intelligence
Researchers still struggle to identify the boundary between:
- unconscious processing; and:
- genuinely conscious awareness.
Many sophisticated cognitive processes may occur unconsciously.
23.11 Easy Problems vs Hard Problems
Figure 23.1 Panel 3 compares relatively tractable problems with deeper philosophical challenges.
23.11.1 Easier Problems
These include explaining:
- attention;
- reportability;
- memory access;
- sensory integration;
- decision-making;
- and behavioural coordination.
These problems are difficult scientifically but generally accessible to experimental investigation.
23.11.2 Harder Problems
These include explaining:
- why subjective experience exists;
- why experience has qualitative character;
- why physical processes feel like anything at all.
These problems remain philosophically controversial.
Importantly:
solving all easy problems may still not fully resolve the hard problem.
23.12 Why Partial Explanations Matter
Figure 23.1 Panel 6 illustrates why partial explanations remain scientifically valuable.
A theory need not solve every dimension of consciousness to contribute meaningfully.
For example:
- Global Workspace Theory may clarify conscious access;
- Recurrent Processing Theory may explain perceptual awareness;
- Predictive Processing may explain inference and expectation;
- Higher-Order theories may explain introspective awareness;
- Embodied theories may explain situated experience;
- Panpsychism may address the metaphysical origin of consciousness;
- Illusionism may reinterpret the hard problem itself.
Different theories therefore contribute different explanatory strengths.
23.13 Theories and Explanatory Targets
Figure 23.1 Panel 4 maps theories onto their primary explanatory targets.
Some theories focus on:
- neural dynamics;
- cognitive access;
- and reportability.
Others focus on:
- phenomenology;
- selfhood;
- embodiment;
- or metaphysical foundations.
This helps explain why:
theories sometimes appear to disagree while actually addressing different explanatory levels.
23.14 Multiple Levels of Explanation
Figure 23.1 Panel 5 illustrates multiple explanatory levels involved in consciousness research.
These include:
23.15 Why Consensus Remains Difficult
Consensus remains difficult partly because consciousness involves:
- neuroscience;
- psychology;
- philosophy;
- computation;
- phenomenology;
- and metaphysics.
Different disciplines prioritize different standards of explanation.
For example:
- neuroscientists may emphasize measurable mechanisms;
- philosophers may emphasize phenomenological coherence;
- AI researchers may emphasize computation and functionality.
Thus disagreements often reflect differing explanatory priorities rather than simple empirical conflict.
23.16 Main Comparative Conclusion
The field of consciousness research has made genuine and important progress.
Researchers now possess far more sophisticated understanding of:
- neural correlates;
- altered states;
- conscious access;
- self-monitoring;
- and large-scale integration.
At the same time, foundational questions concerning:
- subjective experience;
- qualia;
- the explanatory gap;
- and the hard problem
remain unresolved.
Theories should therefore be evaluated according to their stated explanatory goals rather than according to whether they solve every possible aspect of consciousness simultaneously.
Consciousness research may ultimately require:
- theoretical pluralism;
- multi-level integration;
- and continued collaboration across neuroscience, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence.